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We investigate the impact of the stance and path of monetary policy on the level of credit 
risk of individual bank loans and on lending standards.  We employ the Credit Register of 
the Bank of Spain that contains detailed monthly information on virtually all loans granted 
by all credit institutions operating in Spain during the last twenty-two years – generating 
almost twenty-three million bank loan records in total.  Spanish monetary conditions were 
exogenously determined during the entire sample period. 
Using a variety of duration models we find that lower short-term interest rates prior to loan 
origination result in banks granting more risky new loans.  Banks also soften their lending 
standards – they lend more to borrowers with a bad credit history and with high uncertainty.  
Lower interest rates, by contrast, reduce the credit risk of outstanding loans.  Loan credit 
risk is maximized when both interest rates are very low prior to loan origination and interest 
rates are very high over the life of the loan.  Our results suggest that low interest rates 
increase bank risk-taking, reduce credit risk in banks in the very short run but worsen it in 
the medium run. 
Risk-taking is not equal for all type of banks:  Small banks, banks with fewer lending 
opportunities, banks with less sophisticated depositors, and savings or cooperative banks 
take on more extra risk than other banks when interest rates are lower.  Higher GDP growth 
reduces credit risk on both new and outstanding loans, in stark contrast to the differential 
effects of monetary policy. 
Keywords: monetary policy, low interest rates, financial stability, lending standards, credit 
risk, risk-taking, business cycle, bank organization, duration analysis. 
JEL: E44, G21, L14.  “The Fed has a new problem: convincing investors it does not need to cut interest rates yet.  (…)  A rate cut 
does not just increase the supply of cash; it directly influences people’s calculations about risk.  Cheaper money 
makes other assets look more attractive – an undesirable consequence at a moment when risk is being repriced 
after many years of lax lending.” 
 
“Monetary Policy – Hazardous Times,” Leaders, Opinion, The Economist, August 23
rd, 2007 
 
 “The root cause of this credit correction was the Federal Reserve's willingness to keep money too easy for too 
long.  The federal funds rate was probably negative in real terms for close to two years between 2003 and 2005.  
This led to a misallocation of capital.  (…)  An emergency rate cut, as some in the market seem to be 
anticipating or hoping for carries the risk of introducing even greater moral hazard into the financial system” 
 
“The Bernanke Call – II,” Review & Outlook, Editorial, The Wall Street Journal, August 11
th, 2007 
 
“A cut in the Fed funds rate, in contrast, would do little to solve the interbank problem.  The main effect could 
be to reawaken banks' appetite for risk.” 
 
“The Fed and LIBOR,” Lex, Opinion, The Financial Times, September 8
th, 2007 
 
“But knowing that the political pressure to intervene is asymmetric, asserted far more strongly when markets 
turn illiquid and asset prices fall than when markets are excessively liquid and asset prices booming, central 
banks ought also to avoid bringing such situations upon themselves.  Better to lean against the wind with 
prudential norms, tightening them as liquidity exceeds historical levels, than to ignore the boom and be faced 
with the messy political reality of forcibly picking up the pieces after the bust.” 
 
“Central Banks Face a Liquidity Trap”, Raghuram G. Rajan, The Financial Times, September 7
th, 2007 
 
I.  Introduction 
The summer of 2007 was hot for financial markets and central banks.  Troubles in the credit 
markets negatively affected banks, liquidity evaporated in the interbank markets and central 
banks  intervened  on  a  scale  not  often seen before.  Many market observers immediately 
argued that during the long period of low interest rates, stretching from 2001 to 2005, banks 
softened their lending standards and loaded up on excess risk.  During the crisis many market 
participants, nevertheless, clamoured for central banks to reduce the interest rates again to 
alleviate their financial predicament. 
Hazardous times for monetary policy indeed: on the one hand, low interest rates may create 
excessive risk-taking; on the other hand, low interest rates may reduce the risk of outstanding 
bank credit.  In this paper we provide the first hard evidence on this treacherous dilemma by 





the same time reduce credit risk on outstanding loans?  What is the impact of the stance and 
path of monetary policy on credit risk?  And, do monetary and output changes have a similar 
effect on bank risk?       
Though the effects of monetary policy on the volume of credit in the economy have been 
widely studied (see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Kashyap 
and Stein (2000)), its effects on the composition of credit, in particular on the riskiness of 
borrowers, have not yet been empirically explored.  On the basis of recent theoretical work 
we can understand how changes in short-term interest rates may affect risk-taking in financial 
institutions.  Matsuyama (2007) for example shows that an increase of the borrowers’ net 
worth (through a decrease in interest rates e.g.) reduces agency costs thus making financiers 
more  willing  to  lend  to  riskier  borrowers  (with  less  access  to  pledgeable  assets).    Low 
borrowers’ net worth, on the other hand, may impel financiers to flee to quality (Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)).  Low interest rates may also abate adverse selection problems 
in the credit markets, causing banks to relax their lending standards and increase their risk-
taking (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006)).  In general, low interest rates make riskless assets 
less attractive for financial institutions increasing their demand for riskier assets with higher 
expected returns (Rajan (2006)).
1 
We study the impact of the stance and the path of monetary policy on the risk-taking and 
loan credit risk of banks.  For econometric identification, exogenous monetary policy and 
comprehensive data on individual bank loans are needed.  The Credit Register of the Bank of 





new  and  outstanding,  commercial  and  industrial  loans  by  all  credit  institutions  in  Spain 
during the last twenty-two years – generating almost twenty-three million bank loan records 
in  total.    The  Register  also  contains  essential  information on lending standards and loan 
performance that are key to our analysis.  Spanish monetary conditions were exogenously 
determined during this period, initially from 1988-98 through a policy that aimed at a fixed 
exchange rate with the Deutsche Mark, as of 1999 within the Eurosystem.
2  For this reason 
we use the German then Euro overnight interbank rates as our measure of monetary policy 
stance. 
Using a variety of duration models and controlling for bank, firm, loan and macroeconomic 
characteristics, we analyse how short-term interest rates prior to loan origination and during 
the life of the loan affect the loan hazard rate (default probability per unit of period).  We find 
that the hazard rate increases with lower interest rates at loan origination but also increases as 
a result of higher rates during the life of the loan. 
We not only find that lower interest rates prior to loan origination result in banks granting 
loans with higher credit risk, but also that banks soften their lending standards: they lend 
more to borrowers with a bad credit history and with higher uncertainty.  All these results 
suggest that bank risk-taking increases when interest rates are lower prior to loan origination 
and that in this way monetary policy affects the composition of credit in the economy (i.e., 
the quality distribution of borrowers in the banks’ loan portfolios). 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
1  Den  Haan,  Sumner  and  Yamashiro  (2007)  document  aggregate  shifts  within  credit  categories  following 
monetary and output changes.  They suggest their findings may be caused by a decline in bank risk-taking when 
short-term interest rates are high.  See also Borio (2003), Borio and Lowe (2002) and Crockett (2003). 
2 As a result of the textbook ‘Mundell-Fleming trilemma’ (Blanchard (2006) or Krugman and Obstfeld (2006) 





Conditioning  on  the  loan  being  granted,  lower  interest  rates  reduce  the  credit  risk  of 
outstanding loans.  Consequently, there is a completely different impact of lower interest 
rates on the credit risk of new vis-à-vis outstanding loans.  In the short-term, lower interest 
rates reduce the total credit risk of banks since the volume of outstanding loans is larger than 
the volume of new loans.  In the medium-term, however, low interest rates worsen the total 
credit risk in banks.  Our results, therefore, suggest that low interest rates encourage risk-
taking, reduce credit risk in the short-term but worsen it in the medium-term. 
Risk-taking is not equal for all type of banks:  small banks, banks that are net lenders in the 
interbank market – i.e., banks with fewer good lending opportunities and/or banks that are 
less monitored by other banks – and savings or cooperative banks take on more extra risk 
than other banks when interest rates are lower.  Therefore, balance-sheet strength, investment 
opportunities, moral hazard and bank ownership shape the effects of monetary policy on risk-
taking. 
In stark contrast to the differential effects of monetary policy, we find that higher GDP 
growth reduces credit risk both for new and outstanding loans.  This result and the main 
result of the paper may imply that there may be other financial inefficiencies outside the 
traditional channels (Rajan (2006)) that explain the results of this paper. 
To the best of our knowledge, Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydró (2007) and this paper are the 
first to investigate the impact of monetary policy on risk-taking.  Ioannidou et al. (2007) have 
access  to  loan  pricing,  which  allows  them  to  improve  the  econometric  identification  of 
whether short-term interest rates cause extra bank risk taking.  They find that, when interest 
rates are low, not only do banks take on higher risk but they also reduce the loan rates of risky 





developed  country  and  analyses  the  dynamic  implications  of  monetary  policy  and  GDP 
growth for bank credit risk over a long time period and exploiting more variation in bank 
characteristics. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II further reviews our empirical strategy.  
Section III models the time to default of bank loans and introduces the variables employed in 
our empirical specifications.  Section IV presents the results.  Finally, Section V summarizes 
the results and concludes. 
II.  Empirical Strategy 
We want to investigate the effects of the stance – and path – of monetary policy on bank 
risk, in particular the impact of short-term interest rates prior to loan origination and during 
the life of the loan on the loan default risk.  Essential ingredients in our empirical strategy are 
a valid measure of bank credit risk, the exogeneity of monetary policy, and a methodology 
that accounts for its dynamic context.  Spain delivers the first two elements, i.e. the Credit 
Register of the Bank of Spain – that we have access to – contains comprehensive information 
on Spanish bank lending necessary to construct a valid measure of risk, and Spain had a 
reasonably exogenous monetary policy since 1988.  We estimate duration models to analyze 
the dynamic impact of monetary policy on credit risk. 
An ideal ex ante measure of credit risk requires access to the precise, evolving, and truthful 
predictions of the default probability bank loan officers (may) hold for each individual loan at 
each moment in time.  Internal or external credit ratings are sometimes rather crude and static 
proxies (for such predictions).  The loan rate may suffer as a proxy from the variation over 





The coverage and time span of the Credit Register, however, assures that a proxy that relies 
on ex post default information comes close to the predictions the bank loan officers originally 
had.  Indeed, the Register, first employed by Jiménez and Saurina (2004) and Jiménez, Salas 
and Saurina (2006) for example, contains confidential and detailed monthly information on 
(almost) all commercial and industrial loans given by all credit institutions operating in Spain 
during  a  22-year  period.    The  credit  register  is  almost  comprehensive,  as  the  reporting 
threshold for a loan is only 6,000 Euros.  This low threshold alleviates any concerns about 
unobservable bank activity.  The Register contains complete records on almost 23,000,000 
bank loans. 
The  dataset  further  contains  detailed  firm,  bank  and  loan  information,  such  as:  Firm 
identity, province and industry; bank identity, legal status, size, and various asset classes; and 
loan instrument, currency, maturity, degree of collateralization, and the amount available and 
drawn.  Crucial for our purpose, the dataset also includes unique loan repayment information 
(i.e., whether the loan is overdue or not).  Hence, we know whether and when a loan defaults.  
There is, however, no information on the interest rate of the loan.  The only comparable 
dataset,  we  are  currently  aware  of,  that  is  both  comprehensive  and  containing  default 
information is the Bolivian Credit Register analyzed in Ioannidou and Ongena (2007) and 
Ioannidou et al. (2007).
3 
                                                 
 
3 The incomplete coverage of the widely used U.S. (National) Survey of Small Business Finances or other 
private  datasets  like  Loan  Pricing  Corporation  dataset  (e.g.,  Petersen  and  Rajan  (1994),  Berger  and  Udell 
(1995),  Bharath,  Dahiya,  Saunders  and Srinivasan (2006)) complicates the analysis of individual bank risk 
taking.  The reporting threshold in the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Credit Register dealt with in Ongena, Tümer-
Alkan and von Westernhagen (2007) for example is 1,500,000 Euros.  Non-performance of individual loans 
seems  not  recorded  in  the  otherwise  comprehensive  Belgian  or  Italian  Credit  Registers  (e.g.,  Degryse, 





There are around 350 commercial banks, savings banks, cooperatives and credit finance 
establishments  operating  in  Spain  at  any  moment  in  time  during  the  sample  period.  
Reporting institutions that wish to study the credit record of any applicant have access to the 
Register, but only at an aggregate level and without the possibility to obtain the borrower’s 
history. 
We extract quarterly records on business loans running from 1985:I to 2006:IV and study 
the impact of monetary policy on bank risk from 1988:II onwards.  Monetary policy was 
mostly  exogenously  determined  during  this  period  and  can  be  adequately  measured  by 
German  and  Euro  overnight  interest  rates  (the  latter  interest  rate  starts  in  1999:I).
4    The 
sample period spans more than a complete domestic economic cycle. 
Our duration analysis relies on a dynamic proxy for risk, i.e., the time to default.  We define 
default on payment (i.e., the event we wish to model) to occur when, three months after the 
date of maturity or the date of an interest payment, the debt balance remains unpaid. 
                                                 
 
4 Until 1983 monetary policy was based on a quantity target approach.  Starting in 1984, without explicitly 
abandoning  a  quantity  target,  the  Bank  of  Spain  started  to  devote  much  more  attention  to  interest  rate 
developments (i.e., adherence to quantity targeting meant increasing the volatility in interest rates).  Hence, 
around the mid-eighties quantity targeting was leaving room for interest rate targeting.  In 1986 Spain joined the 
European  Union,  thus  opening  the  economy  to  the  business  cycles  in  other  large  European  countries.  
Accordingly, monetary policy was paying more and more attention to the exchange rate and, in particular, to the 
bilateral  peseta/Deutsche  mark  exchange  rate.    In  doing  so,  the  monetary  policy  authorities  were trying to 
incorporate an element of discipline and credibility in its fight against inflation.   By mid-89 Spain joined the 
European Monetary System and, thus, its exchange rate mechanism, making explicit the exchange rate target 
with the Deutsche mark.  In addition, in order to convince the public of the commitment the new regime entailed 
and counteracting the concurrent expansionary fiscal policy, temporary credit growth ceilings were established 
(second  half  of  1989  and  1990).    The  second  half  of  1992  witnessed  the  collapse  of  the  exchange  rate 
mechanism (the Italian lira and British pound in fact left the system) while other currencies, including the 
Spanish peseta were devaluated (in September 1992, November 1992 and May 1993).  From 1994 to 1998 
monetary policy was oriented towards joining the Eurosystem and, thus, was also supporting an exchange rate 
target and closely tied to the core of European monetary policy (i.e., German monetary policy).  All in all, it 
seems  fairly  reasonable  to  use  German  monetary  policy  as  a  good  and  exogenous  proxy  for  the  Spanish 





When  we  analyze  the  impact  of  interest  rates  prior  to  loan  origination  on  loan  time to 
default, we employ the time to default of individual bank loans, observed ex post as our 
measure of bank risk-taking ex ante.  However, we do observe all new and outstanding loans 
over a very long time period and can control for multiple bank characteristics and time-
varying macro conditions in our estimations making it harder to argue that the realizations of 
time to default systematically differs from the expectations.  Our results further hold for other 
ex ante proxies of risk based on lending standards at the time of the loan origination, such as 
lending to borrowers with credit history of past defaults and lending to firms that are new 
borrowers in the banking system (which imply that banks face high uncertainty on these 
borrowers). 
We employ duration models to disentangle the impact on the time to default of monetary 
policy around loan origination from the impact during the life of the loan.  Equivalent to the 
time to default in duration models is the hazard rate, which is the probability of loan default 
during each period given default did not occur before.  The hazard rate constitutes in effect a 
proper  and  intuitive  measure  of  per  period  risk-taking.    To  construct  a  measure  of  loan 
default  that  is  normalized  per  unit  of  period  (hazard  rate)  is  crucial,  since  theory  (e.g. 
Matsuyama (2007) and Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006)) shows that monetary policy affects 
risk taking and lending standards and, therefore also maturity. 
The  final  step  in  our  empirical  strategy  consists  in  exploiting  the  cross-sectional 
implications of the sensitivity in bank risk-taking to monetary policy according to the strength 
of  banks’  balance  sheet (Matsuyama  (2007))  and  moral  hazard problems (Rajan (2006)).  
Hence, we include interactions of the interest rates with bank characteristics and study their 





III.  Model and Variables 
A.  Duration Analysis 
Following Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007) 
for example we analyze the time to default (of the individual bank loan) as a measure of risk.  
This section develops the econometric methodology we employ.
5 
Let T represent the duration of time that passes before the occurrence of the default of the 
loan.    In  the  econometrics  literature,  the  passage  of  time  is  often  referred  to  as  a  spell.  
Repayment of the loan will prevent us from ever observing a default on this loan and hence 
the loan spell can be considered right censored.
6  We return to right censoring later in this 
section. 
A  simple  way  to  describe  the  behavior  of  a  spell  is  through  its  survivor  function, 
) ( ) ( t T P t S ≥ = , which yields the probability that the spell T lasts at least to time  t.  The 
behavior of a spell can also be described through the use of the hazard function.  The hazard 
function determines the probability that default will occur at time t, conditional on the spell 
surviving until time t, and is defined by: 
) (
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=
→ ∆ λ ,                    (1) 
                                                 
 
5  Heckman  and  Singer  (1984b)  and  Kiefer  (1988)  review  duration  analysis.    Duffie  et  al.  (2007)  discuss 
empirical  bankruptcy  models.    Ongena  and  Smith  (2001)  and  Farinha  and  Santos  (2002)  employ  duration 
analysis for other applications in empirical banking. 
6 Loans to small firms typically carry a relatively short maturity, often without early repayment possibilities; 
hence, we choose to ignore early repayment behavior captured in the competing risk model of McDonald and 





where  ) (t f  is the density function associated with the distribution of spells.  Neither the 
survivor function nor the hazard function provide additional information that could not be 
derived  directly  from  ) (t f .    Instead  these  functions  present  from  an  economical  and 
conceptual point of view interesting ways of examining the distribution of spells. 
The hazard function provides a suitable method for summarizing the relationship between 
spell length and the likelihood of switching.  The hazard rate provides us effectively with a 
per-period measure of risk taking.  When  ) (t λ  is increasing in t, the hazard function is said 
to exhibit positive duration dependence, because the probability of ending the spell increases 
as the spell lengthens. 
When  estimating  hazard  functions,  it  is  econometrically  convenient  to  assume  a 
proportional hazard specification, such that: 
) exp( ) (
) ), ( , (
lim ) ), ( , ( 0
0 t t X t
t
t X t T t t T t P
t X t β λ
β
β λ ′ =
∆
≥ ∆ + < ≤
=
→ ∆ ,       (2) 
where  t X  is a set of observable, possibly time-varying explanatory variables, β is a vector 
of  unknown  parameters  associated  with  the  explanatory  variables,  ) ( 0 t λ   is  the  baseline 
hazard function and  ) exp( t X β′ is chosen because it is non-negative and yields an appealing 
interpretation  for  the  coefficients,  β.    The  logarithm  of  ) ), ( , ( β λ t X t   is  linear  in  t X .  
Therefore, β reflects the partial impact of each variable X on the log of the estimated hazard 
rate. 
The baseline hazard  ) ( 0 t λ  determines the shape of the hazard function with respect to time.  
The Cox (1972) partial likelihood model bases the estimation of β on the ordering of the 









α λα λ t t , and allows for duration dependence, i.e., it reflects the fact that the 
loan  has  survived  until  t.    When  1 > α   the  distribution  exhibits  positive  duration 
dependence.  The exponential distribution, which exhibits constant duration dependence, is 
nested  within  the  Weibull  as  the  case  1 = α .    To  estimate  hazard  functions  maximum 
likelihood methods are used. 
Explanatory variables can vary through time.  To obtain interpretable estimates from the 
proportional hazard models, it is required that the variables be either “defined” or “ancillary” 
with respect to the duration of a spell (see Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980)).  A defined 
variable follows a deterministic path.  Age is an example of a defined variable because its 
path  is  set  in  advance  of  the  loan,  and  varies  deterministically  with  loan  duration.    An 
ancillary variable has a stochastic path, but the path cannot be influenced by the duration of 
the spell.  One can also assume that the conditional likelihood of ending a spell depend only 
on the value of an ancillary variable at time t, and not on past or future realizations of the 
variable.  Collateralization for example is most probably not ancillary as a bank may increase 
collateral requirements when time to default would decrease. 
Censoring  is  a  crucial  issue  to  be  addressed  when  estimating  a  duration  model.    Not 
knowing when a loan starts, or after repayment when it would end, or both, means we are 
unable to observe the ‘true’ time to default for these observations.  With no adjustment to 
account for censoring, maximum likelihood estimation of the proportional hazard models 
produces biased and inconsistent estimates of model parameters. 
Accounting  for  right-censored observations can be accomplished by expressing the log-
likelihood function as a weighted average of the sample density of completed duration spells 





censoring is less straightforward (Heckman and Singer (1984a)); hence, in economic duration 
analysis  is  often  ignored.    Our  sample  consists  out  of  new  loans  granted  from  1998:II 
onwards, which avoid the left censoring problem in our sample. 
B.  Variables 
We are interested on the impact of monetary policy on the time to default of individual bank 
loans.  The way in which we will express the coefficient will actually feature the equivalent 
hazard rate as the left hand side variable.  The hazard rate is our main proxy for loan risk and 
has an intuitive interpretation as the per-period probability of loan default provided the loan 
‘survives’ up to that period. 
Suppose a loan l is granted in quarter τ .  Let T denote the time to maturity or the time to 
default in case of an overdue repayment; hence, repayment or default would occur in quarter 
T + τ .  We differentiate between monetary policy conditions present in the quarter prior to 
the origination of the loan (at  1 − τ ) and policy conditions prevailing during the life of the 
loan.  In a non time-varying duration model the latter is measured at  1 − +T τ , while in a 
time-varying  duration  model  all  quarters  between  τ   and  1 − +T τ  will contribute to the 
estimation.  We index these periods  t + τ , with  1 0 : − →T t .  Figure 1 clarifies the timing of 
the  variables  within  the  context  of  a  Non  Time-Varying  and  Time-Varying  Duration 
Analysis. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
We measure monetary policy conditions using the quarterly average of nominal German 
and, from 1999:I onwards, Euro overnight interbank interest rate.  Consequently, we label the 





taken over the life of the loan as INTEREST RATET-1 or INTEREST RATEτ+t , dependent on 
whether we use non time-varying or time-varying duration models. 
We include dummies for the period of credit control, which ran from 1989:III to 1990:IV, 
and for the currency devaluations that took place during the quarters 1992:III, 1992:IV, and 
1993:II.  As the Spanish Peseta was solidly pegged to the German Mark, not surprisingly the 
correlations between Spanish and German interest rates are very high (depending on the rate 
and the period involved the correlations range between 70% and 90%).  In addition to the 
measures  of  monetary  policy  conditions,  an  array  of  bank  (b),  firm  (f),  loan  (l),  and 
macroeconomic controls are included.  Table 1 defines all the variables employed in the 
empirical  specifications  and  provides  their  mean,  standard  deviation,  minimum  and 
maximum. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
BANK SIZEbτ-1 measures the relative size of the bank vis-à-vis the other banks, OWN 
FUNDS/TOTAL  ASSETSbτ-1  is  the  amount  of  bank  equity  over  total  bank  assets, 
INTERBANK POSITION/TOTAL ASSETSbτ-1 is the net amount of interbank lending by the 
bank over total assets, and BANK NPLbτ-1-NPLτ-1 is the difference between the bank and the 
other banks level of non performing loans.  All characteristics are measured prior to the loan 
origination quarter.  We further include time-invariant dummies that equal one if the bank is 
a SAVINGS BANKb (0/1) or a CREDIT COOPERATIVEb (0/1). 
Firm controls include a past default dummy, BORROWER RISKfτ-1 (0/1), that equals one if 
the borrower was overdue any time before on another loan, and zero otherwise.  This variable 





We do not have direct access to the actual date of registration of the firm, but we know 
when the firm borrowed for the first time during our long sample period.  The variable 
LN(2+AGE AS BORROWERfτ-1) measures the age of the borrower in the credit register and 
for most firms will be highly correlated with actual age.  This variable is also by construction 
left censored, but removing it or limiting its backward looking horizon to five years (older 
than five years or not) does not alter our main results.  In addition to these firm variables we 
construct ten Industry dummies and fifty Province dummies.
7 
We include the log of the loan amount, LN(SIZE OF THE LOANlτ), dated in the quarter of 
loan  origination  τ .    A  dummy  variable  COLLATERALl  (0/1)  equals  one  if  the  loan  is 
collateralized and equals zero otherwise.  FINANCIAL CREDITl (0/1) equals one if the loan 
is a financial credit and equals zero otherwise.  Four MATURITYl dummies stand for the 0 to 
3 month, 3 month to 1 year, 1 to 3 year, and 3 to 5 year classes. 
We also feature the growth in real gross domestic product prior to the origination and during 
the life of the loan, GPDGτ-1 and GPDGT-1 or GPDGt-1.  TIME TREND and TIME TREND
2 
(as  in  Kashyap  and  Stein  (2000))  or  EFFICIENCY  RATIOt  (%)  and  FINANCIAL 
INCOME/ATAt (%) capture general economic, market and technological developments.
8 
                                                 
 
7 Due to technical estimation constraints we only include firm fixed effects in a basic linear regression model.  
We feature the time to default as the dependent variable and attribute all right censored observations the value of 
double the length of the sample period.  Results are unaffected. 
8 We also included various long-term interest rates, inflation and a time-varying International Country Risk 





IV.  Results 
A.  Cox (1972) Model 
To keep estimations manageable, we randomly sample three percent of the loans in the 
Credit Register and work with 674,133 loans or 1,987,945 loan-quarters.
9 The full sample 
includes all commercial and financial loans (about the 80% of the total amount of credit in 
Spain)  to  non-financial  firms  granted  by  commercial  banks,  savings  banks  and  credit 
cooperatives excluding non-Spanish subsidiaries and branches. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The estimates in Table 2 are based on ML estimation of the proportional hazard model 
using the Cox (1972) partial likelihood function in Model I or the Weibull distribution in 
Models II to VI as the baseline hazard rate.  In Table 2 we estimate a non time-varying 
model; hence none of the variables vary over the periods.  All estimates are adjusted for right 
censoring and standard errors are clustered by firm. 
The estimated coefficients in Model I on INTEREST RATEτ-1 and INTEREST RATEτ+T-1 
equal –0.069 and +0.207, respectively.  Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 
1% level and are economically relevant.  These coefficients represent one of our key results.  
Lower interest rates increase the hazard rate on new loans but decrease the hazard rate on the 
outstanding loans.  This finding suggests that lower short-term interest rates in the economy 
make  banks  take  on  new  loans  with  higher  credit  risk  while  reduce  the  credit  risk  on 





The coefficients on the control variables are on the whole similar throughout the rest of the 
analysis; hence we briefly discuss them here.  Most coefficients are statistically significant, 
except  the  coefficient  on  BANK  SIZEbτ-1.    The  coefficients  on  OWN  FUNDS/TOTAL 
ASSETSbτ-1 and INTERBANK POSITION/TOTAL ASSETSbτ-1 for example are negative 
indicating that, not surprisingly, banks with more own funds at stake or net lenders in the 
interbank market grant loans with lower hazard rates.
10  The coefficient on BANK NPLbτ-1-
NPLτ-1 is positive suggesting that banks seemingly persist in hazardous lending.  Savings 
Banks and Cooperatives grant more risky loans. 
Borrowers that defaulted on their loan in the past, i.e. when BORROWER RISKjτ-1 (0/1) 
equals one, are more likely to have a higher hazard rate on their current loans and that ‘older’ 
borrowers have a lower one.  Smaller, collateralized, financial, and shorter maturity loans are 
more  risky,  though  the  coefficient  on  COLLATERALl  (0/1)  turns  insignificant  in  some 
robustness checks. 
Finally, our results on real GDP growth are also remarkable.  The hazard rate on both new 
and outstanding loans is lower when GDP growth is higher.  This result contrasts with, and 
further corroborates, the estimated effects of monetary policy on credit risk. 
B.  Weibull Specifications 
Next we subject our results to a battery of robustness checks.  Our main results remain 
mostly unaffected however.  In Model II we employ the Weibull distribution as the baseline 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
9 We sample on the basis of certain index numbers in the database that were randomly assigned through time. 
10 In the first case, the higher the own funds at stake, the lower the incentive to take risk (as in Keeley (1990)).  





hazard  rate  because  after  one  or  two  initial  quarters  overdue  repayments  could  become 
conditionally more likely over the life of the loan.  Indeed, the estimate of ln(α) suggests the 
existence  of  positive  duration  dependence.  The  coefficients  on  INTEREST  RATEτ-1  and 
INTEREST  RATEτ+T-1  equal  -0.062***  and  0.299***,  respectively  (we  will  explore 
economic relevancy later).
11 
In Model III we replace the trend variables with the variables EFFICIENCY RATIOτ-1 and 
FINANCIAL  INCOME/ATAτ-1  respectively.    We  introduce  time  trends  or  these  specific 
variables to capture improvements in efficiency in the Spanish banking sector during the last 
20 years.  The percentage non-performing loans and the efficiency of the banking sector in 
general have dramatically improved in Spain, potentially biasing our results if we would not 
control for this effect. 
Banks may shorten loan maturity to offset the increase in the hazard rate, thereby affecting 
the degree of right censoring.  Despite the controls for loan maturity and the estimation 
procedure that adjusts for right censoring, we are still concerned about possible resulting 
spuriousness in our results.  Consequently in Model IV we retain only loans with a maturity 
longer  than  one  year,  in  effect  removing  more  than  three  quarters  of  our  observations.  
Results are mostly unaffected. 
In  Model  V  we  interact  INTEREST  RATEτ-1  with  GPDGτ-1.    Results  are  unaffected.  
Finally, in Model VI we first-difference the interest rates and GDP growth variables, but 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
that later we analyze how these net interbank lenders behave in periods of low interest rates and that results 
change significantly. 
11 As in the tables, we use stars next to the coefficients in the text to indicate their significance levels:  *** 





leave the dependent variable in levels.  Except for the sign on GPDGT-1 - GPDGτ-1, which 
turns out to be positive, the results corroborate our earlier findings. 
C.  Time-varying Duration Models and Interactions 
Next we allow interest rates and GDP growth to be time-varying and introduce interactions 
with bank characteristics.  Bank susceptibility to monetary policy at loan origination may 
depend upon bank size and liquidity, as in Kashyap and Stein (2000) for example, on their set 
of lending opportunities, or on the bank’s propensity to moral hazard when granting new 
loans may further depend on its net borrowing in the interbank market, its type or ownership 
structure.  We report the estimates in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We find that small banks, banks that are net lenders in the interbank market, and savings or 
cooperative banks take on more extra risk than other banks when interest rates are low.  
Hence, the strength of the balance sheet reduces the impact of monetary policy on risk-taking.  
Banks that borrow from other banks (and are therefore better controlled or/and have better 
investment  opportunities)  increase  less  their  risk-taking  when  interest  rates  are  lower.  
Finally,  ownership  clearly  matters.    We  are  currently  working  on  generating  more  bank 
characteristics that can help us to disentangle whether lending opportunities or moral hazard 
are driving some of the results. 
D.  The Impact of the Path of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk 
Before  turning  to  alternative  ex  ante  measures  of  risk,  we  investigate  the  economic 
relevancy of our results and also how the stance and the path of monetary policy affect bank 





We employ the coefficients of Model II in Table 2 to calculate an annualized hazard rate for 
a loan with an actual maturity of twelve months,
12 but otherwise mean characteristics, for 
various  “paths  of  monetary  policy”  –  i.e.,  for  different  combinations  of  on  INTEREST 
RATEτ-1 and INTEREST RATEτ+T-1.  For ease of exposition Figure 2 displays some of these 
combinations. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
For example, if the short-term interest rate in the economy is equal to its sample mean at 
loan origination and at maturity (4.13 % and 4.09 % to be exact), the annualized loan hazard 
rate is estimated to be 0.56 %.  In sharp contrast, if the interest rate is equal to its sample 
minimum (2.16 %) at origination, but increases to its sample maximum (9.62 %) at maturity, 
the loan hazard rate increases more six-fold to 3.38 %.  On the other hand, if the “path is 
reversed” and the funds rate drops from its maximum to its minimum, the hazard rate drops 
to 0.22 %. 
The results suggest that during long periods of low interest rates banks may take on more 
credit risk and relax lending standards.  Exposing the “hazardous” cohort of loans, granted 
when rates were low, to swiftly increasing policy rates dramatically exacerbates their risk, 
these estimates suggest.  But while suggestive of the impact of changes in monetary policy on 
the loan hazard rates, the estimates so far are really only calculated for one loan cohort at a 
time.  To obtain a correct assessment of a monetary policy path on the aggregate hazard rate, 
cohort size and timing needs to be properly accounted for (loans granted during the period of 
                                                 
 
12 The choice of the actual maturity matters because the estimated parameter of duration dependence does not 





the increase in the policy interest rate will have a lower and lower hazard rate for example).  
We leave such an exercise for future work. 
E.  Ex Ante Measures of Risk  
Table 4 shows how short-term interest rates prior to loan origination affect ex ante lending 
standards and risk-taking.  Model I shows that low interest rates imply than banks give more 
loans to borrowers that have a bad credit history, i.e., riskier borrowers that defaulted in the 
past. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
We  also  construct  the  variable  NEWfτ-1  (0/1),  a  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  the 
borrower is the first time that borrows from a bank, else 0.  Model II shows that low interest 
rates correspond to banks giving more loans to borrowers that are new to the Spanish credit 
register.  New borrowers have in general more uncertain cash flows and are therefore riskier. 
All in all, these results show that banks lend to ex-ante riskier borrowers when interest rates 
are low prior to loan origination.
13 
V.  Conclusions and Future Research 
Controlling for macroeconomic conditions and for bank, loan, and firm characteristics, we 
find  that  prior  to  loan  origination  lower  short-term  interest  rates  may  motivate  banks  in 
granting loans with higher credit risk.  In addition, banks soften their lending standards; in 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
actual maturities does not qualitatively alter the results.  The contracted maturity on the other hand is set equal 
to its sample mean. 
13 Jiménez and Saurina (2006) find that lending standards worsen during good times leading them to support 





particular, banks grant more loans to borrowers with a bad credit history and with higher 
uncertainty.  These results suggest that bank risk-taking increases when interest rates prior to 
loan origination are low and that monetary policy affects the composition of credit in the 
economy as proposed by Matsuyama (2007), Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) and Rajan 
(2006). 
Conditioning on the loan being granted, lower interest rates imply lower credit risk – i.e., 
lower interest rates reduce the credit risk of outstanding loans.  This is because refinancing 
costs  are  lower  and,  therefore,  credit  risk  is  lower.    Consequently  there  is  a  completely 
different impact of lower interest rates on the credit risk of new vis-à-vis outstanding loans. 
In the short-run lower interest rates reduce total credit risk of banks since the volume of 
outstanding loans is larger than the volume of new loans.  In the medium term, lower interest 
rates, however, increase credit risk in the economy.  In particular, a period of low interest 
rates  followed  by  a  severe  monetary  contraction  maximizes  credit  risk,  as  the  already 
“hazardous” cohort of new loans gets exposed to higher interest rates as outstanding loans.  
On the other hand, and asymmetrically, vertical declines in interest rates minimize total credit 
risk ceteris paribus. 
The impact of monetary policy on risk-taking is not equal for all banks: small banks, banks 
that are net lenders in the interbank market, and savings or cooperative banks take on more 
extra risk than other banks when interest rates are low.  Therefore, balance-sheet strength, 
investment  opportunities,  moral  hazard  and  type  of  bank  ownership  shape the impact of 
monetary policy on bank risk-taking. 
We also find that higher GDP growth both for new and outstanding loans reduce credit risk.  





therefore,  fewer  problems  between  lenders  and  borrowers.    However,  the  effect  of  GDP 
growth on risk-taking is different from the effect of short-term interest rates on risk-taking.  
This result may imply that there may be other financial inefficiencies (Rajan (2006)) that 
explain the results of this paper. 
We  are  currently  working  to  extend  our  study  in  a  number  of  directions.    First,  bank 
ownership, in particular public listing, and ownership dispersion may matter for risk taking 
incentives.  Also the effect of monetary policy on risk-taking may depend on bank liquidity 
holdings,  outstanding non-performing loans, and local banking competition.  Second, we 
currently focus on the impact of monetary policy on the hazard rate of individual bank loans.  
We  obviously  overlook  the  correlations  between  loan  default  and  the  impact  on  each 
individual  bank’s  portfolio  or  the  correlations  between  all  the  banks’  portfolios  and  the 
resulting systemic impact of monetary policy.  Third, we have only studied the effects of 
monetary policy on the composition of credit in one dimension, i.e., risk.  Industry affiliation 
and maturity of the funded projects for example may also change.  Fourth, we choose a priori 
for  a  parsimonious  empirical  model,  but  one  can  further  investigate  the  effects  of  other 
macroeconomic conditions such as the volatility of GDP growth, inflationary expectations or 
the term structure for example on the risk of new and outstanding loans.  Finally, given the 
cohorts of loans and initial and ending policy rates for a time period, one can calculate on the 
basis of the estimated coefficients the path of monetary policy rates that would minimize the 
total amount of credit risk.  It would be interesting to compare this path to the actual path that 
was followed.  We leave all these extensions for future developments of this and other work.FIGURE 1.  NON TIME-VARYING AND TIME-VARYING DURATION ANALYSIS AND THE TIMING OF THE MONETARY POLICY VARIABLES 
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Hazard Rate FIGURE 2. MONETARY POLICY PATHS AND LOAN HAZARD RATE 
The figure displays various paths for the interest rate (in %) and the resulting annualized 
Loan Hazard Rate (in %) calculated for a loan with a maturity of four quarters but otherwise 
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TABLE 1.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The table defines the variables employed in the empirical specifications and provides their mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. 
 
Variables Definition Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
DEFAULTl (0/1) 1 if there is default, i.e, if three months after the date of maturity or the 
date of an interest payment, the debt balance remains unpaid
0.005 0.068 0 1
INTEREST RATEτ-1 (%) Quarterly averages of German and Euro overnight interest rates (the 
latter interest rate starts in 1999:I)
4.135 2.166 2.023 9.619
BANK SIZEbτ-1 (%) Relative size of the bank vis-à-vis the other banks 3.827 3.800 0.000 15.122
OWN FUNDS/TOTAL ASSETSbτ-1 (%) The amount of bank equity over total bank assets 6.324 2.470 -10.813 80.945
INTERBANK POSITION/TOTAL ASSETSbτ-1 (%) The net amount of interbank lending by the bank over total assets 1.214 10.179 -92.746 91.561
BANK NPLbτ-1-NPLτ-1 (%) The difference between the bank and the other banks level of NPLs -0.013 1.793 -4.784 68.969
SAVINGS BANKb (0/1) 1 if the bank is a saving bank 0.319 0.466 0 1
CREDIT COOPERATIVEb (0/1) 1 if the bank is a credit cooperative 0.050 0.218 0 1
BORROWER RISKfτ-1
 (0/1) 1 if the borrower was overdue any time before on another loan 0.111 0.314 0.000 1.000
LN(2+AGE AS BORROWERfτ-1) Age is the number of years from the first time the firm borrowed from a 
bank
2.874 1.102 0.000 4.477
LN(SIZE OF THE LOANlτ) The log of the loan amount 4.175 1.376 1.792 15.061
COLLATERALl (0/1) 1 if the loan is collateralized 0.077 0.267 0 1
FINANCIAL CREDITl (0/1) 1 if the loan is a financial credit 0.457 0.498 0 1
MATURITYl 0m.-3m. (0/1) 1 if the loan matures before 3 months 0.421 0.494 0 1
MATURITYl 3m.-1y. (0/1) 1 if the loan matures between 3 months and 1 year 0.375 0.484 0 1
MATURITYl 1y.-3y. (0/1) 1 if the loan matures between 1 year and 3 years 0.099 0.298 0 1
MATURITYl 3y.-5y. (0/1) 1 if the loan matures between 3 year and 5 years 0.035 0.185 0 1
GPDGτ-1 (%) Growth in real gross domestic product  3.032 1.312 -1.833 6.193
EFFICIENCY RATIOτ (%) Expenses and gross operating margin 60.189 4.011 49.087 65.964
FINANCIAL INCOME/ATAτ (%) Interest income plus dividends received over average total assets 3.905 1.721 2.033 7.162 
TABLE 2.  NON TIME-VARYING DURATION MODELS 
The estimates this table lists are based on ML estimation of the proportional hazard model using the Cox (1972) partial likelihood function 
(Model  I)  or  the  Weibull  distribution  (Models  II  to  VI)  as  baseline  hazard  rate.    The  parameter  ln(p)  measures  the degree of duration 
dependence.  The dependent variable is the hazard rate.  The definition of the other variables can be found in Table 1.  Subscripts indicate the 
time of measurement of each variable.  τ  is the month the loan was granted.  T is the time to repayment or default of the loan.  None of the 
variables vary over time.  All estimates are adjusted for right censoring.  Coefficients are listed in the first column, with z-statistics reported in 
italics in the second column.  *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
 
 
I II III IV V VI
Cox Weibull Weibull Weibull > 12 Months Weibull Weibull
Independent Variables Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic
INTEREST RATEτ-1 -0.069 -3.200 *** -0.062 -3.250 *** -0.086 -3.680 *** -0.058 -2.080 ** -0.040 -1.340
INTEREST RATEτ+T-1 0.207 11.120 *** 0.299 17.520 *** 0.291 17.390 *** 0.378 14.170 *** 0.299 17.460 ***
INTEREST RATEτ-1*GDPGτ - 1 -0.007 -1.020
∆INTEREST RATEτ-1 -0.404 -6.080 ***
∆INTEREST RATEτ-2 -0.097 -1.450
∆INTEREST RATEτ-3 -0.011 -0.150
INTEREST RATEτ+T-1-INTEREST RATEτ-1 0.095 7.600 ***
BANK SIZEbτ-1 -0.005 -0.690 -0.003 -0.410 -0.004 -0.580 -0.035 -2.740 *** -0.003 -0.380 -0.002 -0.280
OWN FUNDS/TOTAL ASSETSbτ-1 -0.045 -4.360 *** -0.055 -5.140 *** -0.054 -5.090 *** -0.091 -4.870 *** -0.055 -5.150 *** -0.046 -4.350 ***
INTERBANK POSITION/TOTAL ASSETSbτ-1 -0.016 -8.900 *** -0.017 -9.310 *** -0.017 -9.330 *** -0.008 -3.090 *** -0.017 -9.210 *** -0.019 -9.970 ***
BANK NPLbτ-1-NPLτ-1 0.052 9.020 *** 0.057 9.130 *** 0.055 8.910 *** 0.060 7.540 *** 0.057 9.190 *** 0.056 8.940 ***
SAVINGS BANKb (0/1) 0.495 10.170 *** 0.459 9.070 *** 0.457 9.000 *** 0.470 5.560 *** 0.458 9.050 *** 0.464 9.140 ***
CREDIT COOPERATIVEb (0/1) 0.553 5.200 *** 0.598 5.520 *** 0.592 5.460 *** 0.174 0.980 0.598 5.510 *** 0.595 5.510 ***
BORROWER RISKfτ-1
 (0/1) 1.213 18.630 *** 1.245 18.740 *** 1.251 18.840 *** 1.215 13.370 *** 1.245 18.740 *** 1.271 18.670 ***
LN(2+AGE AS BORROWERfτ - 1) -0.187 -10.810 *** -0.185 -10.520 *** -0.188 -10.730 *** -0.056 -2.160 ** -0.185 -10.500 *** -0.177 -9.860 ***
 
LN(SIZE OF THE LOANlτ) -0.103 -5.890 *** -0.101 -5.570 *** -0.100 -5.510 *** -0.131 -5.100 *** -0.101 -5.580 *** -0.099 -5.400 ***
COLLATERALl (0/1) 0.180 2.500 ** 0.053 0.680 0.050 0.640 0.157 1.730 * 0.053 0.680 0.050 0.640
FINANCIAL CREDITl (0/1) 0.656 9.590 *** 0.647 9.770 *** 0.639 9.630 *** 1.391 4.050 *** 0.648 9.790 *** 0.648 9.650 ***
MATURITYl 0m.-3m. (0/1) 1.031 10.770 *** 1.475 14.180 *** 1.471 14.150 *** 1.473 14.150 *** 1.546 14.810 ***
MATURITYl 3m.-1y. (0/1) 0.821 10.380 *** 1.366 15.350 *** 1.360 15.290 *** 1.365 15.330 *** 1.420 15.900 ***
MATURITYl 1y.-3y. (0/1) 0.270 3.220 *** 0.786 8.610 *** 0.784 8.610 *** 0.466 4.790 *** 0.785 8.600 *** 0.820 8.930 ***
MATURITYl 3y.-5y. (0/1) -0.035 -0.380 0.233 2.380 ** 0.236 2.420 ** 0.137 1.420 0.233 2.380 ** 0.236 2.400 **
 
GPDGτ-1 -0.219 -11.810 *** -0.241 -13.400 *** -0.271 -14.190 *** -0.337 -11.880 *** -0.193 -3.700 ***
GPDGτ+T-1 -0.040 -1.790 * -0.018 -0.880 -0.022 -1.080 -0.030 -0.950 -0.016 -0.800
∆GPDGτ-1 -0.118 -2.360 **
GPDGτ+T-1-GPDGτ-1 0.052 3.370 ***
TIME TREND 0.193 7.580 *** 0.186 7.370 *** 0.124 3.140 *** 0.185 7.390 *** 0.075 3.490 ***
TIME TREND
2 -0.001 -8.570 *** -0.001 -7.940 *** 0.000 -3.540 *** -0.001 -7.930 *** 0.000 -4.900 ***
EFFICIENCY RATIOτ - 1 0.066 7.700 ***
FINANCIAL INCOME/ATAτ - 1 0.133 3.770 ***
CONSTANT -22.291 -10.990 *** -13.825 -21.470 *** -17.100 -5.500 *** -22.366 -11.100 *** -12.105 -7.630 ***
ln(α) (duration dependence) 0.657 74.790 *** 0.658 75.470 *** 0.489 28.700 *** 0.657 74.650 *** 0.588 71.310 ***
Industry dummies (10) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Province dummies (50) yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. of Observations (Loans) 674,133 674,133 674,133 137,567 674,133 674,133
Log pseudolikelihood  -34,559 -15,765 -15,773 -5,463 -15,764 -16,021
χ
2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TABLE 3.  TIME-VARYING DURATION MODELS INCLUDING INTERACTIONS WITH BANK CHARACTERISTICS 
The estimates this table lists are based on ML estimation of the proportional hazard model using the Weibull distribution as baseline hazard 
rate.  The parameter ln(p) measures the degree of duration dependence.  The dependent variable is the hazard rate.  The definition of the other 
variables can be found in Table 1.  Subscripts indicate the time of measurement of each variable.  τ  is the month the loan was granted.  T is the 
time to repayment or default of the loan.  Variables that vary over time have a subscript τ+t.  All estimates are adjusted for right censoring.  
Coefficients are listed in the first column, with z-statistics reported in italics in the second column.  *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
* significant at 10%.  
 
 
I II III IV
Independent Variables Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic
INTEREST RATEτ-1 -0.102 -6.350 *** -0.133 -7.650 *** -0.097 -5.950 *** -0.070 -3.840 ***
INTEREST RATEτ-1*BANK SIZEbτ-1 0.014 4.590 ***
INTEREST RATEτ-1*INTERBANK/TAbτ-1 -0.002 -3.160 ***
INTEREST RATEτ-1*SAVINGS BANKb -0.052 -3.030 ***
INTEREST RATEτ-1*CREDIT COOPERATIVEb -0.208 -4.320 ***
INTEREST RATEτ+t 0.064 3.200 *** 0.061 3.060 *** 0.062 3.100 *** 0.056 2.810 ***
BANK SIZEbτ-1 0.004 0.510 -0.061 -3.650 *** 0.006 0.690 0.007 0.870
OWN FUNDS/TOTAL ASSETSbτ-1 -0.045 -4.320 *** -0.047 -4.460 *** -0.047 -4.500 *** -0.048 -4.500 ***
INTERBANK POSITION/TOTAL ASSETSbτ-1 -0.021 -11.290 *** -0.021 -11.290 *** -0.009 -2.280 ** -0.021 -10.920 ***
BANK NPLbτ-1-NPLτ-1 0.052 8.550 *** 0.054 8.840 *** 0.051 8.490 *** 0.052 8.620 ***
SAVINGS BANKb (0/1) 0.519 10.100 *** 0.540 10.340 *** 0.523 10.220 *** 0.814 7.400 ***
CREDIT COOPERATIVEb (0/1) 0.712 6.550 *** 0.717 6.570 *** 0.704 6.460 *** 1.677 7.230 ***
BORROWER RISKfτ-1
 (0/1) 1.227 18.040 *** 1.223 18.030 *** 1.223 17.930 *** 1.222 17.980 ***
LN(2+AGE AS BORROWERfτ - 1) -0.152 -8.400 *** -0.151 -8.320 *** -0.152 -8.410 *** -0.151 -8.360 ***
 
LN(SIZE OF THE LOANlτ) -0.114 -6.260 *** -0.114 -6.220 *** -0.113 -6.190 *** -0.113 -6.210 ***
COLLATERALl (0/1) 0.068 0.880 0.070 0.910 0.068 0.880 0.074 0.960
FINANCIAL CREDITl (0/1) 0.637 9.370 *** 0.641 9.450 *** 0.634 9.340 *** 0.638 9.410 ***
MATURITYl 0m.-3m. (0/1) 1.464 14.290 *** 1.480 14.470 *** 1.469 14.310 *** 1.472 14.390 ***
MATURITYl 3m.-1y. (0/1) 1.327 15.330 *** 1.345 15.530 *** 1.335 15.460 *** 1.333 15.420 ***
MATURITYl 1y.-3y. (0/1) 0.719 8.060 *** 0.724 8.120 *** 0.732 8.220 *** 0.731 8.200 ***
MATURITYl 3y.-5y. (0/1) 0.166 1.710 * 0.176 1.810 * 0.182 1.880 * 0.182 1.880 *
 
GPDGτ-1 -0.190 -11.810 *** -0.185 -11.550 *** -0.194 -11.910 *** -0.194 -11.970 ***
GPDGτ+t-1 -0.095 -5.340 *** -0.096 -5.360 *** -0.095 -5.300 *** -0.094 -5.290 ***
TIME TREND 0.053 2.320 ** 0.049 2.160 ** 0.045 1.960 * 0.056 2.430 **
TIME TREND
2 0.000 -4.210 *** 0.000 -4.030 *** 0.000 -3.830 *** 0.000 -4.380 ***
EFFICIENCY RATIOτ+t
FINANCIAL INCOME/ATAτ+t
CONSTANT -8.982 -4.870 *** -8.578 -4.670 *** -8.413 -4.520 *** -9.235 -4.990 ***
ln(α) (duration dependence) 0.699 81.020 *** 0.699 81.220 *** 0.699 80.290 *** 0.701 80.770 ***
Industry dummies (10) yes yes yes yes
Province dummies (50) yes yes yes yes
No. of Observations (Loan - Quarters) 1,987,945 1,987,945 1,987,945 1,987,945
Log pseudolikelihood  -15,696 -15,684 -15,691 -15,681
χ
2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TABLE 4.  PROBIT MODELS 
The estimates this table lists are based on probit models.  The dependent variable is indicated 
in the table.  The definition of the other variables can be found in Table 1.  Subscripts 
indicate the time of measurement of each variable.  τ  is the month the loan was granted.  T is 
the time to repayment or default of the loan.  Variables that vary over time have a subscript 
τ+t.  Coefficients are listed in the first column, with z-statistics reported in italics in the 
second column.  *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
I II
Dependent Variable BORROWER RISK=1 (0/1) NEW= 1 (0/1)
Independent Variables Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic
INTEREST RATEτ-1 -0.029 -3.890 *** -0.047 -11.470 ***
BANK SIZEbτ-1 -0.007 -2.760 *** 0.004 3.440 ***
OWN FUNDS/TOTAL ASSETSbτ-1 -0.011 -3.940 *** 0.000 0.120
INTERBANK POSITION/TOTAL ASSETSbτ-1 -0.001 -2.030 ** 0.002 5.260 ***
BANK NPLbτ-1-NPLτ-1 0.009 3.220 *** -0.007 -4.330 ***
SAVINGS BANKb (0/1) 0.040 2.140 ** 0.217 28.530 ***
CREDIT COOPERATIVEb (0/1) 0.127 2.980 *** 0.172 11.080 ***
BORROWER RISKfτ-1
 (0/1)
LN(2+AGE AS BORROWERfτ - 1) 0.757 23.110 ***
 
LN(SIZE OF THE LOANlτ) 0.053 4.050 *** -0.185 -54.000 ***
COLLATERALl (0/1) 0.172 5.840 *** 0.227 18.770 ***
FINANCIAL CREDITl (0/1) -0.044 -2.060 ** 0.282 41.700 ***
MATURITYl 0m.-3m. (0/1) 0.059 1.970 ** -0.513 -38.250 ***
MATURITYl 3m.-1y. (0/1) 0.133 5.240 *** -0.382 -30.460 ***
MATURITYl 1y.-3y. (0/1) 0.106 4.300 *** -0.314 -23.420 ***
MATURITYl 3y.-5y. (0/1) 0.101 3.840 *** -0.151 -9.890 ***
 
GPDGτ-1 -0.006 -0.930 0.005 1.460
EFFICIENCY RATIOτ+t 0.013 5.420 *** -0.002 -2.270 **
FINANCIAL INCOME/ATAτ+t 0.161 10.320 *** 0.158 31.790 ***
CONSTANT -4.726 -13.980 *** -1.134 -12.180 ***
Industry dummies (10) yes yes
Province dummies (50) yes yes
No. of Observations (Loan - Quarters) 674,133 674,133
Log pseudolikelihood  -198,206 -125,699
χ
2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 
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